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KENTucKY LAw JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO EF FE,
ASSISTANCE OF CouNsEL.-The Harrison circuit judge appointed the
entire Harrison County Bar, with the exception of the prosecutor
and one elderly attorney, to defend the indigent Wedding. Mr. J.
Thaxter Sims, with three assistants, took charge and conducted the
trial. Wedding was tried twice for murder, with the first trial ending
in a hung jury and the second in a conviction and the death sentence.
The defendant filed a motion to vacate under Ky. R. Cr. 11.42, rais-
ing the issue of whether or not he had had the benefit of "effective
representation" of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and by section 11 of the
Kentucky Constitution as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in
Rice v. Davis.' Held: Reversed. Despite a strong dissent by three
judges, the four member majority stated: "In view of the fact that
all the available lawyers at the Bar were appointed and, by their own
admission, none of them made any reasonable preparation for trial,
we conclude that Wedding was denied effective assistance of coun-
sel."2 Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1965).
The majority cited only Powell v. AlabamaO in support of its de-
cision . It erred in viewing the mere fact of the appointment of the
entire bar as a decisive factor in Powell; this misinterpretation of
Powell led to the erroneous result in Wedding. In Powell the entire
bar had been appointed to defend Negroes who were charged
with raping white girls. On the morning of the trial, when no one
came forward for the defense, a Tennessee lawyer offered to assist
although he was unprepared and unfamiliar with Alabama procedure.
He was joined by a local attorney, and they went to trial within
a few minutes. In holding that the defendants had been denied the
right to assistance of counsel in preparing for trial, the Supreme
Court in Powell relied less on the appointment of the entire bar than
on two other factors: (1) The lack of investigation and preparation
between arraignment and trial; (2) The amount of time which lapsed
between the actual determination of who was to serve as counsel
and the trial itself.
The Supreme Court believed that in the critical period between
arraignment and trial "the defendants did not have the aid of counsel
in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid
as at the trial itself." 4 This statement was quoted by the Kentucky
1366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).2 Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. 1965).
s287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4Id. at 57.
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Court of Appeals in Wedding.5 The Supreme Court further stated in
Powell that the duty to assign counsel,"is not discharged by an as-
signment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude
the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.""
The majority of the Kentukcy court failed to see several distinc-
tions between Powell and Wedding which make the former in-
adequate as a precedent for the latter. First of all, in Powell no one
took charge of preparing the defense until a few minutes before trial;
but, in Wedding, Sims assumed leadership soon after arraignment,
which was in ample time to prepare an adequate defense. In addi-
tion, there was no testimony that Sims and his assistants lacked
time to prepare a defense. Preparation for Wedding's trial was in
fact made. An assistant testified that he had been in Sims' office
on two or three occasions when Wedding was also present but that
the defendant neither made a statement nor aided in his defense.
The jailer testified that he took the defendant to Sims' office four
or five times for conferences which lasted from two hours and a
half to three hours. The testimony of both witnesses went uncon-
tradicted. Obviously attempts were made to prepare a defense for
Wedding, whereas in Powell an attorney met the defendants only
once prior to the day of the trial, and at that time he had not taken
personal charge of the defense.
Sims took the course of action which he did due to his personal
judgment that, under the circumstances, this was the best way to
handle the defense. The prosecution had a very strong case against
the defendant. Witnesses testified that Wedding ran his car into
the curb, hit the decedent, circled the block, and returned to the
scene of the crime. At the same location a witness saw a man carry-
ing another, and decedents body was found some distance away
from where it had been struck. Wedding had the decedent's money
on his person when he was arrested, and three witnesses testified
that he admitted the crime. In addition, Sims had been told by the
circuit judge that no Harrison County jury would give more than a
life sentence, and he agreed with this view. One of the assistants
testified that he had knowledge of what the witnesses would say,
and that no testimony at either trial surprised him. Finally, Wedding
seems to have made no objection during the trial.
Considering the efforts of the assigned counsel, Wedding repre-
sents a major departure in judicial determination of whether, or not
a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel. The court
894 S.V.2d at 106.0 287 U.S. at 71.
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held that the appointment of the entire bar, coupled with its opinion
of the preparation for trial, resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
The discrepancy between this decision and the usual standard is
illustrated by the following statement of the rule in federal courts:
It is generally held that mere mistakes or errors of counsel are not
suffcient to establish a violation of the defendant's constitutional right.
It is only in such extreme instances where the representation has
been so inadequate as to make a farce of the trial that it can be said
that the prisoner was deprived of his constitutional rights.7
The Supreme Court sometimes grants relief in this area when
it finds abuses of this standard," but it usually declines to hear lower
court decisions denying relief.9
A recent aricle pointed out that, in order to warrant a reversal
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, there must be:
[T]he gross errors necessary to meet the test set out by the 'mockery
of justice' rule, and it appears that no single act of incompetence,
however inexcusable and damaging, can satisfy this test. The cumu-
lative effect of an attorney's errors must be sufficient to render the
proceedings a sham. In one sense, the mockery of justice rule is not
a standard for determining efficacy or competence, but is rather a
criterion for determining whether a defendant has in any meaningful
sense, been represented by counsel at all.' 0
In a leading Kentucky case prior to Wedding on what consti-
tutes effective assistance of counsel the court said:
Allegations of serious mistakes on the part of an attorney, standing
alone, even where harm results, are not a ground for habeas corpus.
In all the cases decided on the subject, the circumstances surrounding
the trial must be such as to shock the conscience of the court and
make the proeecding a farce and a mockery of justice.11
This case was cited by the dissent in Wedding.12 Certainly Sims'
defense of Wedding more than met any of these established tests
of effective representation. He spent substantial time preparing for
trial, and his tactics resulted from carefully formulated strategy.
This attorney felt that his client had no hope of receiving anything
'less than a life sentence, and he developed the defense with the
7Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1955).8 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S.
271 (1945).
Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958); Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert denied, 351 U.S. 974 (1956); McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10thCir. 1940), cert denied. 311 U.S. 683 (1940); People v. Boremen, 401 Ill. App.
566, 82 N.E.2d 459 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 927 (1948).10 18 Vand. L. Rev. 1920, 1923 (1965).
11Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1963).
S394 S.W.2d at 109.
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purpose of avoiding the death penalty. The prosecuting attorney
testified that he had never heard a better summation than that given
by Sims.
In rejecting the Wedding approach to effective assistance of
counsel the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
The result of such an interpretation would be to give any ... pris-
oner a hearing after his conviction in order to air his charges against
the attorney who formerly represented him. It is well known that
the drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game in
many penal institutions. Convicts are not subject to the deterrents
of prosecution for perjury and contempt of court which affect ordin-
ary litigants. The opportunity to try his former lawyer has its un-
doubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner. In many cases there
is no written transcript and so he has a clear field for the exercise
of his imagination. He may realize that his allegations will not be be-
lieved but the relief from monotony offered by a hearing in court is
well worth the trouble of writing them down. To allow a prisoner
to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under a liberal
definition of that phrase is to give every convict the privilege of open-
ing a Pandora's box of accusations which trial courts near large penal
institutions would be compelled to hear.13
As Judge Stewart said for himself and two others in a dissent in
Wedding, "One fair trial is all the law prescribes for any man. Ap-
pellant has had his."' 4
Paul F. Guthrie
CONsTrrurIoNAL LAw--EQuAL POTECmON IN JuRy SELEcnON.- The
petitioner, a nineteen-year-old Negro, was indicted for the rape of a
seventeen-year-old white girl in Talladega County, Alabama. In this
small county tventy-six per cent of the males over twenty-one are
Negro, yet no Negro has sat on a petit jury for at least the last
twelve years.' Eight Negroes were selected for the jury venire, two
of whom were exempt from service, and the remaining six were ex-
cluded by the Alabama jury strike system, 2 the petitioner, therefore,
upon conviction challenged the constitutionality of the state's trial
'
3 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945).
14 394 S.W.2d at 109.
' The Supreme Court disagreed as to the period of exclusion. The majority
accepted twelve years, 380 U.S. 202, 205, while the dissent accepted testimony
that no living person could remember when a Negro sat on the petit jury. 380
U.S. 202, 231.
The Alabama jury strike system, which was adopted in 1907, permits each
opposing counsel to alternate in striking jurors without cause until twelve remain
from the original petit jury venire of one hundred men less those jurors struck
for cause. 380 U.S. 202, 210.
